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Upcoming NXP / EmSA / CANopen (FD) Webinar and Videos

April 16th, 2020 No comments

NXP and EmSA are inviting you to the one hour seminar “Accelerate Development of Robust Network Communications with CANopen and CANopen FD” on Tuesday April 21st 2020. This webinar is a hands-on session about customized CANopen (FD) development on NXP MCUs.

In the hands-on part, we take the CANopen (FD) device/slave example included with the NXP MCUXpresso SDK and use the free CANopen Architect Mini software utility to modify and configure the CANopen (FD) communication of the device. Code modifications are made using the MCUXpresso SDK to support the custom generated CANopen (FD) object dictionary entries. Click here to register for this webinar.

The webinar requires some basic CANopen (FD) and MCUXpresso knowledge. See our courses at www.em-sa.com/video to learn the basics about these technologies.

Press Release: Free Micro CANopen Libraries for NXP Microcontrollers

February 24th, 2020 No comments

February 24, 2020 – Embedded Systems Academy (EmSA) and NXP® Semiconductors announce the integration of the free-to-use EmSA Micro CANopen libraries into the NXP MCUXpresso Software Development Kit (SDK) for developing with NXP’s microcontrollers (MCU) and crossovers based on Arm® Cortex®-M.

For years, many MCUs have been equipped with the Controller Area Network (CAN) interfaces including CAN FD. These interfaces are optimized for embedded communication and make it easy to transmit and receive single messages.

“To take full advantage of the capabilities of such interfaces, middleware communication protocols are required,” says Olaf Pfeiffer, General Manager of EmSA. “One of the most
popular protocols for embedded CAN applications is CANopen, for which EmSA has delivered its Micro CANopen software for more than 20 years, and remains highly used among embedded developers.”

Free-to-use versions of EmSA’s Micro CANopen library are now fully integrated into the MCUXpresso SDK for a selection of NXP LPC MCUs and i.MX RT crossover MCUs.

“This integration further simplifies the process of prototyping and integrating sophisticated and reliable communication into embedded systems.” said Brendon Slade, director of MCU ecosystem for Edge Processing at NXP Semiconductors. “For most systems, the libraries can be used in production without further licensing.”

One of the first adopters is PEAK-System Technik: Their industrial I/O module PCAN-MicroMod FD is based on NXP’s LPC54000 MCU series and uses a variation o

f EmSA’s Micro CANopen libraries. “Using a proven CANopen (FD) protocol implementation for our I/O devices greatly reduced our development time and opens up additional use-cases for our customers.”, says Uwe Wilhelm, General Manager of PEAK-System Technik.

For more information about the NXP microcontrollers currently supported by EmSA’s free to use CANopen libraries and video tutorials, visit www.em-sa.com/nxp

About MCUXpresso SDK
Available in downloads based on user selections of MCU, evaluation board and optional software components, the MCUXpresso SDK merges customization and quality in a suite of production-grade runtime software. Complete with pre-integrated RTOS middleware, stacks and middleware, reference software, and MISRA-compliant drivers analyzed with Coverity® static analysis tools, it’s the ultimate software framework and reference solution for application development with NXP MCUs and crossover MCUs based on ARM® Cortex®-M cores.

About Embedded Systems Academy
Embedded Systems Academy (EmSA) is an NXP gold partner and has locations in Barsinghausen, Germany and San Jose, California. EmSA provides tools, training and services for planning, implementing, debugging, commissioning and testing of embedded networking technologies including CAN, CAN FD, CANopen, CANopen FD, CiA447, J1939 and others. EmSA’s tutors Olaf Pfeiffer, Christian Keydel and Andrew Ayre published two books about CAN, CANopen and security on CAN systems. They regularly publish related articles and papers for various international conferences.

Contact
Embedded Systems Academy GmbH
Olaf Pfeiffer
info@esacademy.de

Training and event paper presentation videos online

February 13th, 2020 No comments

Over the last years we published more than 50 articles, papers, books, webinars and we also continuously updated our training materials. However, some of the training material and especially scientific papers only reach a small percentage of the embedded community. Therefore we decided to publish more free educational videos to reach more of you. As a start we created several playlists on our EmSA Youtube channel. These include:

  • CANopen FD Intro:
    Introductory videos to CANopen FD, also covering some basics like an introduction to the CANopen Object Dictionary concept
  • CAN (FD) Security:
    Video collection about CAN and CAN FD security challenges and solutions
  • MCUXpresso Middleware:
    Video collection about NXP’s MCUXpresso and CANopen libraries included

We plan to publish more videos in the upcoming month, further focusing on CAN, CAN FD, CANopen, CANopen FD topics including introductory videos as well as in-depth technology classes.

Please subscribe to the channel to stay informed about new videos published.

See you at the upcoming shows and conferences: #EW2020 and #iCC2020

January 16th, 2020 No comments

This year we present multiple papers at the upcoming Embedded World (25th to 27th of February in Nuremberg, Germany) and the international CAN Conference (17th to 18th March in Baden-Baden, Germany). Chris and I will be talking with our partners of NXP Semiconductors, PEAK

-Systemtechnik and the Hochschule Offenburg about CAN (FD) security and CANopen (FD) Smart Bridging. In our security papers, we examine how different existing and CAN capable security methods can best complement each other. With SmartBridgingFD we show how classical CANopen devices or networks can easily and transparently be mixed with newer CANopen FD installations. As classical CANopen and CANopen FD are not compatible on the bitrate level, they can not share the same CAN wiring. However, the SmartBridgeFD allows combining classical CANopen and new CANopen FD networks into one large logical network.


At the Embedded World, you can see the SmartBridgeFD integrated into the CANopen FD demonstrator at the CiA booth (hall 1 booth 630). Another of our CANopen (FD) demos will be displayed at NXP Semiconductors (hall 4A booth 220), as our CANopen software is now part of NXP’s latest SDK. Our CAN hardware partner PEAK Systemtechnik is in hall 1 (booth 483).

The Embedded World conference program is now online, we are in Session 2.1. The program for the international CAN Conference is here, our papers are in Session IV and VII.

CAN (FD) / CANopen (FD) security specification updates

September 16th, 2019 No comments

Our authors Christian Keydel and Olaf Pfeiffer published an article in the current CAN newsletter, summarizing the current status of CAN security specifications.

Please follow the link above for more details.

Excerpt:

End of June 2019, the CiA association hold a phone conference for safety and security issues. Holger Zeltwanger gave the participants an update regarding “base documents”. When defining security solutions for Classical CAN, CAN FD, or CAN XL systems, it would be preferable to not start from scratch defining security basics for embedded systems or embedded communication systems. Unfortunately, the current draft of ISO 21434 “Road Vehicles – Cybersecurity engineering” does not seem to be suitable, as it is very generic and not yet completed. It is more of a guideline what designers and developers need to keep in mind when designing a “secured” vehicle.

Another document suggested is the “Baseline Security Recommendations for IoT” by the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity. Until the next meeting, CiA will review and report, if that document is suitable to be referred to also by CiA documents. CAN XL is still in an early specification phase and the related special interest group, recognizing the possibility for security features in hardware to be part of future CAN XL controllers, therefore suggested adding security features to CAN XL first. One of the discussed options is a blacklist/whitelist scheme like the one implemented by the NXP secure CAN transceiver family. Such a scheme can eliminate several potential attack vectors at once if all participants in a CAN (XL) network actively support it. Once we see which security features made it into the CAN XL specification (and hardware), we can review if any of these can still be applied to CAN FD, too, for example on the transceiver level.

However, potential CAN controller specific hardware security features will most likely not be suitable to migrate back into CAN FD, so protocol based security solutions are still required.

 

PEAK and EmSA extend partnership on CANopen (FD) and J1939 solutions

June 12th, 2019 No comments

Darmstadt and Hannover, June 12th, 2019. PEAK-System Technik GmbH (www.peak-system.com) and Embedded Systems Academy GmbH (www.esacademy.de) have deepened their partnership to provide common CANopen, CANopen FD, and J1939 solutions. For more than 15 years, Embedded Systems Academy GmbH (EmSA) has offered numerous CANopen software products including monitors, analyzers, simulators, configurators, and protocol stacks for the CAN (Controller Area Network) hardware of PEAK-System Technik GmbH (PEAK). Building on that partnership, PEAK has now become a shareholder and partner of EmSA.

“By formally joining the PEAK Group of companies, we can now more easily share resources and are better positioned to streamline development processes that involve both CAN hardware and software,” says Olaf Pfeiffer, General Manager of Embedded Systems Academy GmbH.
Current projects of PEAK and EmSA include CANopen (FD) generic input and output devices, CANopen (FD) protocol libraries, security options for CAN and diagnostics and test systems for CANopen (FD) and J1939.

“The deepened partnership with EmSA will provide our hardware customers with a variety of easy-to-use software products for CANopen, CANopen FD, and J1939 applications,” says Uwe Wilhelm, General Manager of PEAK-System Technik GmbH. “We’ll announce our new joint CANopen and CANopen FD solutions on our websites and blogs over the coming months.”

Micro CANcrypt: How small can we go?

May 31st, 2019 No comments

Our tutors Christian Keydel and Olaf Pfeiffer published their next security article in the CAN newsletter. This one is about “making security work” for already deployed CAN systems with limited MCU resources available.

Excerpt:

Some things appear to have not changed significantly in the past 20 years of Embedded Systems programming. Back then we would start developing minimal solutions for clients that wanted to add CANopen using “as few resources as possible”. Today, clients want to add CAN security to an already deployed system and again, often with only minimal resources available. Same situation, different technology.

The biggest change compared to unsecured CAN communications is the added security information, and the question is where in the CAN frames we want to put it. In networks that only use 11-bit-identifier CAN frames, like virtually all CANopen systems do, it is convenient if secure frames use a 29-bit CAN identifier instead, as illustrated in figure 1 “Adding security information to a CAN frame”. In the available extra 18-bits long “security record” we can then put a 10-bit signature and some control information. This method greatly simplifies mixing non-secure and secure CAN communications – a secure frame then still uses the same lower 11-bit portion of the 29-bit CAN identifier as the unsecured frame would, and the added security record can be easily recognized. The 18-bit record comprises a 2-bit truncated key refresh counter, a 6-bit truncated timer value and the 10-bit Micro CANcrypt signature. As all devices synchronize their refresh counter and timer locally, the truncated information is enough for receivers to internally maintain the full counter and timer values.

In comparison to CANrypt, Micro CANcrypt uses a simplified key synchronization method. Figure 2 “The Secure Key Sync cycle” illustrates how four event messages use the extended security record to share information. Here the extended security record contains a 16-bit timer and a 16-bit random value. These synchronised messages are used once per second to share / create an initialization vector (IV) for a dynamic, current key from the session key and to synchronize a 16-bit timer value and an 8-bit key refresh counter. A block cipher is used to generate the dynamic key from a shared symmetric permanent key using the IV generated in each cycle.

For more details, read the original article in the CAN Newsletter June 2019

 

Categories: CAN, Security Tags: , ,

CANgineBerry software and firmware updates

May 6th, 2019 No comments

The CANgineBerry (www.cangineberry.com) is a smart coprocessor module for the Raspberry Pi®, other popular embedded microprocessor systems or a PC. It allows offloading CANopen tasks from the main system while communicating with it though a regular serial port which greatly simplifies application development. Firmware for different purposes can be programmed through the same interface. New releases for the CANopen Device and Manager application firmware are now further enhancing the functionality of the CANgineBerry.

The CANopenIA-BEDS (V1.5) firmware for CANopen devices now also supports the tunneling of plain-CAN messages for special cases where CANopen is not used or the network needs custom messages. It also adds CANcrypt to support secure and authenticated CANopen communication between up to 15 participants. Lastly, it now supports an advanced manual triggering for Transmit Process Data Objects (TPDOs) where the host application can decide when exactly to trigger the transmission of a TPDO in addition to the standard fully-automatic mode, .

The CANopenIA-MGR (V1.7) firmware implements a self-configuring CANopen controller/manager. It contiuously monitors the network for new CANopen nodes and scans their configuration in order to set up automatic PDO handling. Also here, the new version implements advanced manual triggering options for TPDOs. For example, when the application wants to write data to a remote CANopen node’s Object Dictionary (OD) entry, the default behavior is that the controller automatically decides which transport — PDO or Service Data Object (SDO) — to use, depending on whether that OD entry is part of a PDO or not. In some cases, more control is desirable, though, so now the application can disable the automatic handling and manually select SDO vs. PDO as well as manually trigger TPDO transmissions.

The latest CANgineBerry software and firmware is available here: [CANgineBerry.com]

The CANgineBerry is available here: [US] [UK] [EU] [DE]

Highlights of upcoming classes at Embedded World Nuremberg, 26th to 29th of February 2019

January 10th, 2019 No comments

With every start of a new year, those preparing for the Embedded World and its conference in Nuremburg get busy – so do we. This year our tutors and partners present several papers, mostly around CAN (FD), CANopen (FD) and security issues. Over the last year it became clear that in embedded communication there are a variety of attack vectors as illustrated in the figure right. For protection, security is required on multiple levels, preferably at every network layer.

Find some recommended classes below. The full program is available here.

Tuesday 26th, from Communication – CAN

09:30 – 10:00 / Troubleshooting in Embedded Networks Based on CANopen FD
Reiner Zitzmann, CAN in Automation

10:00 – 10:30 / Automated Node ID Assignment in CAN and CAN(FD) Networks
Christian Keydel & Olaf Pfeiffer, Embedded Systems Academy

10:30 – 11:00 / Signal Improvement Concept for CAN FD Networks
Yao Yao, CAN in Automation

Tuesday 26th, from HW-based Security

12:00 – 12:30 / Extend MCU Security Capabilities Beyond Trusted Execution with Hardware Crypto Acceleration and Asset Protection
Saurin Choksi, NXP Semiconductors

15:00 – 15:30 / Methods for Provisioning Security Features in a Cortex-M33 based MCU Using A Physically Unclonable Function
Rob Cosaro, NXP Semiconductors

Wednesday 27th, from Architectures & Hacking

16:30 – 17:00 / Securing all Network Layers of CAN (FD) Communication
Olaf Pfeiffer, Embedded Systems Academy
Andreas Walz, Offenburg Univeristy

Meet us at Embedded World

During the show, you will find our tutors either at the CiA booth (hall 1, booth 630) with the CANopen FD Demonstrator or at the NXP booth (hall 4A, booth 220) featuring a Multi-Layer CANopen FD Security Demonstrator.

Security column: Updates and Outlook 2018/2019

November 21st, 2018 No comments

Over the past year, our authors Christian Keydel and Olaf Pfeiffer have published several security- related CAN articles in the CAN newsletter. It’s now time for an up-to-date summary, review and outlook.

How do we address security?

To analyze the application-specific attack scenarios, we can group systems with CAN-connected devices as follows:

  • Private and locked:
    Only trusted persons have physical access to CAN wires and devices. There are no gateways to other networks.
  • Remotely accessible:
    The CAN bus is connected to one or multiple gateways to other networks.
  • Time-limited physical access:
    An untrusted party can be expected to have physical access to the CAN bus and devices for a limited time.
  • Unlimited physical access:
    An untrusted party can be expected to continuously have physical access to the system.

What measures should be taken?

The recommended security measures for the mentioned groups range from none for group 1 to state-of-the-art for group 4 which presents the toughest challenge. With virtually unlimited physical access, an untrusted party can go as far as using flash/code extraction services for MCUs to obtain code and private keys. To thwart such attempts, you will have to use a secure microcontroller with built-in encrypted key and code storage like the NXP LPC54Sxx series for example. Here, the encryption is based on a private PUF (Physical Unclonable Function) which uses physical properties that vary for each chip and can never be extracted, like contents of uninitialized SRAM.

Securing CAN communications is a viable option especially for group 2 and in combination with physical protection also group 3 applications. As we’ve shown, it needs only minimal resources to implement injection monitoring in combination with a secure heartbeat (see article “Scalable CAN security”). However, due to the limited data size in CAN messages, individual message authentication often requires sending a second message with the authentication data.

With CAN FD, adding security becomes easier, as the payload and security record can often be combined in a single CAN FD data frame, avoiding the overhead of managing a second authentication message.

What can we expect in the future?

In the new CiA CAN Cyber Security group it has become clear that where security is required, it should be added to all communication layers.  To add message monitoring and flood protection to the CAN bus, there are hardware solutions like NXPs TJA115x secure CAN/CAN FD transceiver family. Similar protection can be added in software to the lowest driver layers. Just above the data link layer, CANcrypt (FD) provides a secure grouping mechanism. For the CANopen/CANopen FD and J1939 protocol layers, different security features can be implemented, including authenticated access for diagnostics or remote-control features.

Reaching highest security levels will only be possible if the hardware supports securing the software and communications, using built-in features for the protection of stored code and keys.

Categories: CAN, CANopen, Security Tags: , , ,